Edward DeMarco, the temporary
director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, continues to
endure blistering criticism for refusing to allow Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to pay for large-scale principal reductions for
underwater borrowers (those who owe more than their homes are
worth) or to facilitate refinancings for those stuck with high
interest rate mortgages.
The embattled regulator says he is merely trying to prevent
Fannie and Freddie from adding to the more than $190 billion in
losses that taxpayers have covered since September 2008. But
Representative Elijah Cummings has labeled him “the biggest
hurdle standing between our nation and the recovery of the
housing market.” House Democrats have accused him of hiding data
purportedly proving that principal reductions would save money
and reduce foreclosures. And Representative Barney Frank has
called for his resignation.
Beating up DeMarco may prove cathartic for policy makers
looking to assign blame for economic doldrums. The proposed
remedy, however — having taxpayers pay for principal writedowns
and mass refinancings — would do little to solve the nation’s
housing woes.
Consider the math on principal reductions. There are 11.1
million residential properties with underwater mortgages, only
about 3 million of which are backed by Fannie and Freddie.
Almost 80 percent of those 3 million borrowers, however, are
current on their mortgage, demonstrating their commitment and
ability to make payments without a principal reduction.
Consequently, principal writedowns for them would simply
transfer money from taxpayers to the borrowers — with minimal
effect on foreclosure prevention.
Targeted Federal Help
Targeting principal reduction to the 20 percent of
underwater borrowers with delinquent Fannie and Freddie loans
(approximately 600,000 in total) does have the potential to
prevent some foreclosures, but at far too high a price. It is
extremely difficult to target federal help to a select group of
borrowers without providing an incentive for other borrowers to
stop paying their mortgages. Indeed, research by Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison, Tomasz Piskorski, and Arpit Gupta of
Columbia University found a statistically significant increase
in such strategic behavior in response to principal reduction
announcements.
President Barack Obama has proposed using unspent money
from the Troubled Asset Relief Program to offset prospective
Fannie and Freddie losses from principal reductions. Taxpayers
would still pay, but the Federal Housing Finance Agency could
meet its legal mandate to avoid losses at the two firms
themselves.
Even this would offer scant benefit. Principal reduction is
seldom appropriate for underwater borrowers who have not made a
mortgage payment in more than six months; it’s too late for most
of them to avoid foreclosure. For that reason, the president’s
proposal focuses on underwater borrowers who have made a
mortgage payment in the past six months. But only about 10
percent of Fannie and Freddie loans meet that criterion. Thus
such a targeted policy would assist only about 60,000 underwater
borrowers.
A similar logic undermines proposals for government-backed
refinancing of underwater and delinquent homeowners to enable
them to take advantage of today’s low interest rates. Those who
are current on their loans would benefit from a lower interest
rate — but since their payments are current their homes are not
at risk of foreclosure. (Most homeowners who are already
delinquent won’t be able to pay their loans even at a lower
interest rate.)
A stronger economy and more robust job growth are
ultimately needed to boost housing demand, spur prices and
construction, and finally end the foreclosure crisis.
Downward Pressure
Meanwhile, regulators can encourage programs to turn
foreclosures into rentals, which will help ease the downward
pressure on home prices. It would also help to remove some of
the uncertainties that deter potential lenders from taking on
housing-related risks, including the difficulty of taking back a
home from a delinquent borrower and the threat of lawsuits
resulting from loans that go bad through no fault of the lender,
such as a borrower losing a job.
The federal government could also reduce uncertainties over
the validity of the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
used to keep title information, which is essential for mortgages
to be packaged and sold to investors. Standard formats for title
data would preserve local control while facilitating large-scale
housing investments. Similarly, better coordination of
information regarding second liens would facilitate some
modifications that are dependent on bargaining between owners of
the primary mortgage and second lien.
As the housing adjustment continues, we should avoid taking
actions that accomplish little while providing incentives for
borrowers to renege on obligations. Such efforts will only
prolong the problem. Proponents of mass writedowns and
refinancings are better off having DeMarco to kick around than
having him accede to yet another costly, counterproductive
program.
(Ted Gayer is the co-director of economic studies and a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and served as deputy
assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury
Department from 2007 to 2008. Phillip Swagel is a professor at
the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, and served
as assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury
Department from 2006 to 2009.)
Read more opinion online from Bloomberg View.
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To contact the writers of this article:
Ted Gayer at tgayer@brookings.edu
Phillip Swagel at pswagel@umd.edu
To contact the editor responsible for this article:
Mary Duenwald at mduenwald@bloomberg.net
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Article source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-17/principal-reductions-won-t-solve-u-s-mortgage-mess.html